My posts sorted by theme
Anti-representationalist cluster
Core concepts of forms of life
In previous posts, I said that the concepts of “true”, “morally good”, “beautiful”, "valid", “justified”, etc., were indefinable and irreducibly normative concepts.
Charles Taylor's designative vs. constitutive
Charles Taylor, in The Language Animal, distinguishes two meta-theories of language: the designative view and the constitutive view.
Neither belief nor non-belief
In an old post, I had said that anti-representationalism was first and foremost an ineffable attitude towards our drawing board. In a more recent post, I said that anti-representationalism wasn't an attitude, but that it “transformed” the attitude of “belief”.
Neither realist nor anti-realist
In a previous post, I attacked metaphysical realism. The problem is, now that I've delved deeper into anti-representationalism and the views in its cluster, I think the issue is more complex than that.
Keeping truth in ontology
In previous articles, I've talked about dismantling and abandoning truth, arguing among other things that it's a reification/projection of the feeling of correctness in the doxastic realm with “the” correctness that has gained an independent existence, related to “reality” that serves the role of this mind-independent criterion of correctness for belief…
No metaphysical realism without truth
In a previous article, I argued that the concept of “truth” is constitutively normative and has a fundamentally wrong genesis that comes from an erroneous projection/reification of the feeling of correctness in the realm of doxastic attitudes, just as moral properties ("right", "wrong") come from an erroneous projection/reification of the feeling of cor…
Meditation/altered states of consciousness/neurosciences of consciousness
Sensory-affective-self uncoupling
Pain is not a simple/indivisible sensation. From what I understand of the research, it distinguishes 2 (sometimes 3) dimensions: the sensory dimension and the affective-emotional dimension (sometimes the cognitive dimension). (see)
Is the adult world less vivid?
At some point in my adult life, I came to think that the world seemed less vivid, less real, less alive than when I was a child. For a long time, I wondered whether this was really the case or whether it was a form of nostalgia, and what it might be due to.
Self, craving and active inference
I recently read a paper that seeks to explain, within the framework of active inference (see my posts on active inference here and here), the self, (Buddhist) craving, the connection between them, and the effect of meditation on them.
Phenomenological matrix of mindfulness-related practices
I won't go into details (I'm lazy), but here's a nice way to classify meditation's altered states of consciousness according to 7 dimensions.
Criticism of philosophy
Against placement problems
A big chunk of metaphysics/ontology is directly or indirectly permeated by “placement problems”.
Ethics
Agapism and cluelessness
In a previous post, I defended that agapism (the only moral law is to act through and for agape, a kind of unconditional, free and universal love) is better than utilitarianism. At the end of the post, as a bonus argument, I vaguely pointed to the idea that agapism can probably offer some answer to the terrible
Religion
Religion vs. philosophy of life
In a previous post (see also), I argued that religion is a form of life concerned with the organization/transformation/structuring of existential attitudes, of which “God” is the knot.
