Thoughts are just sensations
Introduction
In this post, I will first present a few philosophical contexts. I will then introduce cognitive phenomenology. Finally, I will argue that accepting cognitive phenomenology is a good start, but that we also need a change in our attitude towards the cognitive (“thoughts are just sensations”). This change of attitude allows us to better understand and accept some theories that depart from representationalism.
Contexts
Phenomenology is, in philosophy, the study of the experiential character of subjective experiences. Subjective experiences have a what-it's-like, and phenomenology studies and dissects these what-it's-like. Hearing music and looking at a painting don't have the same what-it's-like, so we say that they have a different experiential character, that they are two different phenomenal experiences, that they don't have the same phenomenology (“phenomenology” can designate a field of study, but also the what-it's-like of a subjective experience, and even a philosophical tradition!), that they don't have the same “qualia” involved, etc.
In analytic philosophy, phenomenology has been somewhat neglected. Of course, analytic philosophers discuss subjective experiences a great deal, but it's usually not to study and dissect them, but to debate their existence, their metaphysics, their epistemology and so on.
For example, where an analytic philosopher generally asks questions like “can phenomenal experience be reduced to matter?”, a philosopher of “classical” phenomenology (the “tradition” initiated by people like Husserl) might, for example, seek to investigate the contribution of our expectations in the subjective experience of perceiving an object (“how is the what-it's-like to look at a table influenced by our expectations and beliefs about tables?”).
Moreover, analytic philosophy seems to have greatly impoverished the concept of subjective experience. The term “qualia”, for example, generally evokes colors, sounds and so on. Few people, when they think of qualia, think of the sensation of being in one's body, the sensation of persistence in the perception of an object that is considered persistent, and so on.
It's quite sad, because it gives us a very poor picture of subjective experience. If cognitive science has taught us anything, it's that subjective experience is an interweaving of a whole lot of sensations from a whole lot of very different modalities, in that a problem in the brain can affect only a precise sensation from a precise modality and give rise to subjective experiences which, although only missing a tiny aspect whose existence wasn't even noticed, are experienced as being totally different.
A well-known example is Capgras syndrome, where affected people have the impression that their loved ones are not really their loved ones, as if they had been replaced by clones, despite intact vision and ability to recognize faces. This impression is due to damage to the system that produces an automatic emotional arousal to familiar faces, and to damage to the system that produces people's “internal representations” (their desires, personality, beliefs, etc.).
Our subjective experience is extremely rich and complex, with many different sensations of different modalities intertwining and influencing each other. Even the simple perception of an apple has an infinitely more complex subjective experience than a “set of colors and shapes”; our experience is thick.
Not only have analytic philosophers greatly neglected a huge part of subjective experience (by constantly talking only about colors, sounds, and sometimes emotions), but they are even denying a huge part of subjective experience; cognitive phenomenology.
Cognitive phenomenology
Philosophers generally distinguish between the “cognitive” and the “non-cognitive”. On the non-cognitive side, they place desires, emotions, sensory sensations, etc., while on the cognitive side they place beliefs, thoughts, understanding, reasoning, memories, judgments, etc.
Cognitive phenomenology is the what-it's-like of cognitive things; what is the experiential character of a belief, a thought, the understanding of a sentence, etc.?
Cognitive phenomenology is extremely controversial in analytic philosophy; most consider that there is simply no such thing as cognitive phenomenology.
Obviously, this is absurd, there's clearly a what-it's-like in having a thought, understanding a sentence, etc., independent, for example, of stuff like the noise of utterances and the images/emotions we associate with them.
I refer to Strawson's work in which he defends cognitive phenomenology and expresses outrage at the shocking fact that it's something we have to defend despite the obviousness.
I don't know why cognitive phenomenology is so controversial. Strawson suggests that, perhaps, it's easier to direct our attention to the sensation of blue than to the sensation of a thought because the thought occupies so much of our mind that it's hard to concentrate on the sensation of the thought rather than the thought. Maybe... Whatever the reason, there is a cognitive phenomenology, and it's easy to notice with a little effort.
Thoughts are just sensations
Accepting that the cognitive has a phenomenology is good, but it's not enough. Even accepting that the cognitive has a phenomenology, it seems that many don't have at all the same attitude towards the cognitive as towards the non-cognitive. This difference is hard to express, so let me use an analogy.
Let's imagine a tiny island in the middle of the ocean, an island that is constantly being battered by the waves. Here, the island represents our self, and the waves represent our sensations. But it doesn't seem to us that our cognitive is waves; it seems to us that waves include sensory sensations, emotions, etc., but we imagine our cognitive instead as a lighthouse standing in the middle of the island.
We see the cognitive as something that transcends sensations, that sees beyond; we associate the cognitive with activity (not passivity), solidity, penetration, beyond, transcendence, light, the self (thought as activity, as movement, as a manifestation of our self), and so on.
The lighthouse is on the island (our self), it transcends the waves, sees beyond, illuminates, etc.
But we shouldn't see the cognitive in this way. The cognitive is part of the waves; thoughts are just sensations.
Some might try to find differences between the cognitive and the non-cognitive.
“Cognitive controls our behavior!” So does anger.
“Cognitive can be dispositional, we keep believing something even without thinking about it!” So does anger (we can be “hot-tempered” without being immediately angry).
“Cognitive influences our perception, what we see!” So does anger.
Etc.
What I'm trying to say is not that the cognitive is identical to anger; of course not, the cognitive has a different phenomenology from that of emotions (it's another modality of phenomenology), the cognitive doesn't have exactly the same role in psychology as that of emotions, the cognitive allows things that emotions don't, and so on.
What I'm trying to say is that the cognitive, though of another modality, is still only waves; there is no lighthouse (there is no island either, but the no-self is another subject).
We need to destroy this special attitude towards the cognitive, we need to have the same attitude towards the cognitive as towards the non-cognitive. Yes, the cognitive is different in some respects from the non-cognitive, but this difference is superficial (like the difference between color and sound) and does not justify this difference in attitude.
We could say that the cognitive is “special” waves (a whirlpool, or a big wave that synchronizes the others), but the cognitive is still the domain of the waves and not the lighthouse.
Conclusion
Realizing that the cognitive is in the realm of waves and that there is no lighthouse is truly illuminating. The traditional attitude towards the cognitive is unhealthy, illusory, unjustified. Obviously, destroying this attitude requires effort. First, you have to meditate on the cognitive in order to notice its experiential character, which eludes many people. Then you have to meditate and reflect for a long time to slowly wash away the attitude towards the cognitive that sticks to you despite the realization of cognitive phenomenology.
But once one has really deeply assimilated that the cognitive is in the realm of waves and that there is no lighthouse, a liberation and “small enlightenment” follows. One can more easily understand and accept the theories and themes of anti-representationalism that I discuss on this blog.