No metaphysical realism without truth
In a previous article, I argued that the concept of “truth” is constitutively normative and has a fundamentally wrong genesis that comes from an erroneous projection/reification of the feeling of correctness in the realm of doxastic attitudes, just as moral properties ("right", "wrong") come from an erroneous projection/reification of the feeling of correctness in the realm of moral attitudes.
Moral properties, aesthetic properties and alethic properties (“true”, “false”) are therefore ill-children of an erroneous projection/reification of feelings.
Something I'd like to stress is that metaphysical realism is itself largely an offspring of this faulty birth.
The erroneous projection/reification of the feeling of correctness in doxastic attitudes has, yes, given birth to the rotten concept of “truth”, but it has also brought about metaphysical realism.
Once the rotten concept of truth had been generated (a kind of mind-independent criterion of correctness for beliefs, with these objectively and timelessly true propositions out there for us to discover), it was only a short step to arrive at ideas of “objective facts” and “objective external reality” that play this role of mind-independent criteria of correctness for beliefs, just as moral facts play this role of mind-independent criteria of correctness for actions.
In abandoning moral realism, you have to abandon moral facts. And in abandoning “truth realism”, you have to abandon facts simpliciter, you have to abandon reality simpliciter; you have to abandon metaphysical realism.
You can't just abandon truth, metaphysical realism has to fall with it.