Anti-representationalism

Introduction

In this post, I'll try to present one of my important stances, anti-representationalism (of language and thought), and I'll defend its ineffability.

Representationalism and anti-representationalism

It's rather hard to present representationalism and anti-representationalism, as I consider them to be an ineffable opposition (ineffable but important). So I'll start by simply presenting the opposition in the traditional way:

Representationalism holds that assertions, beliefs, words, concepts, propositions, etc., are “representational tools”. These linguistic and mental entities are seen as having some form of semantic relation to a mind-independent external reality. Concepts have an extension, a reference, an intentionality; they “stand for” elements of an external reality, they have an “aboutness”. Propositions and assertions “represent” an external reality, they can, in a certain way, be “compared” to an external reality, and they are “true” if they “mirror” or “correspond” well to this mind-independent reality. Language is seen as serving to say things “about” this reality, and when it fails to correspond, or when it cannot correspond, there is an error, either in terms of truth, or in terms of language use.

Representationalism is the classic package of metaphysical realism + correspondence theory of truth + common sense view of language in terms of classical semantics.

Anti-representationalism sees all of this as a wrong way of looking at things. Representing an external reality is not what we do, should do or can do with language, truth is not a matter of resemblance between propositions and an external reality, these semantic relations of reference and the like are absurd, and so on.

Anti-representationalism is found in philosophers such as Rorty, Price, Brandom, Knowles, etc., and “generally” manifests itself in (neo)pragmatist theories, deflationary theories, etc.

Ineffability

To understand the problem I have with this kind of presentation of representationalism and anti-representationalism, it's good to know that most philosophers consider that you can be a metaphysical realist and still be anti-representationalist.
Indeed, it is generally considered that, in order to be a metaphysical realist, it is enough to assert/believe something like “external objects exist independently of my opinion”, regardless of whether one understands this assertion/belief in an inflationary or deflationary way. The idea being that the opposition realism/anti-realism is a first-order subject, while the opposition representationalism/anti-representationalism is a second-order subject (meta-semantics, philosophy of language), and that these two orders are distinct and relatively isolated from each other; as long as one asserts/believes that there exist external objects independently of one's opinion, one is a metaphysical realist, even if one is a neopragmatist or deflationist.

The problem I have is that, just as we can believe in a deflationary/neopragmatist way in the existence of external objects independently of our opinion, it seems that we can believe in a deflationary/neopragmatist way in a correspondence theory of truth, a substantial theory on the metaphysics of reference, and so on.

But then we arrive at some form of regress; we can't formulate anti-representationalism at the first order because it conflicts with substantial assertions (which are understood in a deflationary way) of that order, we can't formulate anti-representationalism at the second order because it conflicts with substantial assertions (which are understood in a deflationary way) of that order, we can't formulate anti-representationalism at the third order, the fourth order, and so on.
Anti-representationalism can't be expressed in any order, it seems ineffable.

The drawing board analogy

Let's imagine we have a drawing board on which we can draw with colored pencils. Each color is a concept, each colored drawing on the drawing board is a belief, and the drawing board is our doxastic web.

Anti-representationalism is usually presented by saying that, on our drawing board, we can draw objects outside the drawing of our head, but we can't draw a connection (correspondence, reference, etc.) between the drawings in our drawn head and the drawings outside our drawn head.

I disagree. I think that, although anti-representationalism is often accompanied by certain theories in philosophy of language and metasemantics that prevent drawing such connections, it's not necessary. Anti-representationalism shouldn't constrain what we can or can't draw on our drawing board. Rather, anti-representationalism is an ineffable attitude towards our drawing board.

Anti-representationalism is an ineffable attitude towards the drawing board that comes (for me, but there are other ways of getting there) from the realization that, if there is an external world, it's not built of colored pencil strokes.

Some people will read this and say “I understand this perfectly, look, I've removed lots of colors from the drawings outside my drawn head, I've put all the other colors in the drawings inside my drawn head and I've only left the color green in my drawings outside my drawn head, green being the color of has a structure to allow me to establish the correspondence relation in terms of isomorphism”, but it's doubtful they've really understood. Why should the realization that the external world, if it makes sense to talk about such a thing, is not constructed of colored pencil strokes, lead to the removal of some colors but not others from the drawings outside our drawn head on our drawing board?
Others will say “I understand this perfectly, look, on my drawing board, I've reserved the color red only for drawings outside my drawn head, red being the color is not constructed of colored pencil strokes”, but it's doubtful they've really understood.

Anti-representationalism doesn't constrain what we should draw on our drawing board; it's an attitude towards the drawing board that doesn't have to be drawn on it. An anti-representationalist could have a drawing board identical in every respect to that of a representationalist, what distinguishes them is an ineffable attitude towards the drawing board related to an ineffable realization. For me, the ineffable realization that the external world, if it makes sense to speak of such a thing, is not constructed of colored pencil strokes, that colors exist only on the drawing board (yes, all colors, even the color of possesses a structure, or the color of property). It's the realization that there are no colored lines connecting the external world to our drawing board. Drawing on our drawing board a connection between drawings outside our drawn head and drawings inside our drawn head (even a very beautiful and colorful drawing of a connection, like a complex causal theory of reference), is just connecting two drawings on our drawing board with a drawn connection. This is the realization that it doesn't make sense to talk about comparing our drawing board to the external world; the structure of the external world can't be compared to the structure of our drawing board because is structured is just a color of a pencil limited to the drawing board.

Representationalism has a kind of hard-to-formulate feeling that if we could “get out of our heads” and adopt a “God's eye view”, if we could come into direct contact with external reality (if it makes sense to talk about such a thing) without a veil of perceptions or anything else, we could somehow evaluate our drawing board by comparing it to our direct contact with reality.
But our concepts have conditions of applicability precisely linked to what happens from our non-God's eye view (our phenomenal experience, the drawings on our drawing board, the drawing board that transforms our phenomenal experience and merges with it, etc.). If we were to get out of our own heads and get directly in touch with external reality (if it makes sense to talk about such a thing), yes, we wouldn't find any colored pencil strokes, but we also wouldn't find anything to fulfill the conditions of applicability of our concepts, since the conditions of applicability of our concepts are things in our head from a non-God's eye view. What this means is that from a God's eye view, not only would we not be in direct contact with the colored pencil strokes of external reality (because it's not made of colored pencil strokes) to be able to compare external reality with our drawing board, but we'd be in contact with absolutely nothing that could fulfill the conditions of applicability of our concepts, as if concepts were non-functional in such an environment, as if we wanted to start a fire on the Moon in the absence of oxygen.
(A representationalist might object that they don't believe in the coherence of a God's eye view, but I think this metaphor still captures their sentiment pretty well. You do what you can with the limits of language.)

(And obviously, everything I've just said can't or hasn't or shouldn't be drawn on our drawing board, it's all just dubious and inappropriate metaphors.)

Caveats

Some might read all this and think “oh, that's the map/territory distinction” and think they've figured it out by having clearly distinguished on their drawing board the drawings outside their drawn head and the drawings inside their drawn head, and having drawn the two in different colors and drawn that they may not match. But that's obviously completely different. This distinction is radically representationalist in spirit, as can be seen from the terms “map” which must “match” the “territory”.
Others might say “oh, it's what we call construct/perspective awareness in adult developmental psychology” or “oh, it's instrumentalism” or “oh, it's meta-rationality” or... But no, it's none of these.

Anti-representationalism is something ineffable that can be realized by reading about neopragmatism, deflationism, metaphysical anti-realism, engaging in contemplative practice and so on. Go read Sellars, Rorty, Brandom, Horwich, Williams, Price, Knowles, Carnap, Putnam, Hirsch, Thomasson and so on. But bear in mind that you don't have to draw what they say on your drawing board; you can, if you wish, simply hold their insight in your soul and draw a perfectly normal drawing board.

I really insist that you don't have to draw the anti-representationalist ideas on your drawing board, but of course you can. If you like a neopragmatist theory of language (as I do), you can draw neopragmatism on your drawing board. But keep in mind that anti-representationalism is not a position of meta-semantics or philosophy of language, it's an ineffable posture towards the drawing board, although this posture may be ignited by a neopragmatism drawn on our drawing board (as it may not).

A breath of fresh air

The anti-representationalist attitude brings a completely different relationship to our drawing board. This relationship is rather difficult to explain, but we can roughly say that an anti-representationalist has a more flexible and less serious attitude towards his drawing board. An anti-representationalist sees his drawing board for what it is: a drawing board. There is no transcendent authority to which his drawings respond, other than personal or phenomenal considerations.

The anti-representationalist is not required to harmonize his drawing board perfectly; his drawing board can do what is expected of it, even if “there seems to be bits missing, or bits that don't fit”.
The anti-representationalist may have several drawing boards, and rather than trying to reduce them all to a single one (in line with philosophy's widespread desire to naturalize anything and everything), he may coordinate or superimpose them, or make a patchwork of them. He's not afraid of “exotic” colors; abstract objects, moral properties, composed objects, why not?
The anti-representationalist is not afraid to choose what he draws in an unconventional way. Why limit himself to a strict epistemology? He can juggle between several epistemologies, and embrace the place of subjective values in his choice of what to draw.

All this is not to say that the anti-representationalist draws anything and everything on his drawing board. The anti-representationalist masters “rationality” very well, but uses it with flexibility, ambiguity, detachment, lightness, embracing the place of subjective values in drawing.